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In the past few decades, the Middle East and North Africa has experienced two seemingly 
disparate phenomena: the effects of anthropogenic climate change and a high degree of civil 
unrest. Though on the surface these two phenomena may seem completely separate, there is 
evidence that government response to climate change affects the level of civil unrest among 
populations in this region. This paper hypothesizes that there is a relationship between these two 
phenomena. The hypothesis is tested using the case studies of Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Sudan 
in a controlled comparison. This paper finds that effective government response to climate 
change lessens the intensity of civil unrest while ineffective or nonexistent government response 
increases the intensity of civil unrest.  
 
3 
Literature Overview  
Climate Change and Environmental Degradation in MENA 
 Over the past several years, human-induced climate change has become a widely 
accepted and well-researched phenomenon among scientists across the world. The Middle East 
North Africa Region (MENA) has been the subject of numerous studies on the effects of climate 
change.1 This region includes over 355 million people and is characterized by Arabic as the 
dominant language and Islam as the dominant religion, though the MENA countries encompass 
many different ethnic and linguistic groups.2 
This region is characterized by a variance of maritime conditions and topographical 
features, which contribute to its diverse climate patterns. The largest portion of MENA is 
naturally water scarce and considered hyper-arid.3 The MENA region has come to be considered 
a climate hotspot, where the effects of climate change are felt at a higher rate than the rest of the 
world.4 As a predominantly water-scarce region, MENA countries have experienced 
environmental degradation and stress throughout their histories, but climate change has begun to 
exacerbate the existing environmental problems in this region. MENA is especially vulnerable to 
climate impacts on water resources, and droughts are a common trend in this region.5 This 
section will examine the current literature on trends and future projections for environmental 
degradation and climate change in the MENA region. 
                                               
1 For a map of all countries included in this region, see Appendix A. 
2 “World Bank Definition: Middle East and North Africa,” Worldbank.org, World Bank, accessed March 29, 2017, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena. 
3 Wilco Terink et. al., "Climate change projections of precipitation and reference evapotranspiration for the Middle 
East and Northern Africa until 2050," International journal of climatology 33, no. 14 (2013): 3056. 
4 Alex de Sherbinin, "Climate change hotspots mapping: what have we learned?." Climatic Change 123, no. 1 
(2014): 23;  “Climate Change and Impacts in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East: A Regional Assessment.” 
The Cyprus Institute (2012): 4. 
5 Jeannie Sowers et. al., “ "Climate change, water resources, and the politics of adaptation in the Middle East and 
North Africa." Climatic Change 104, no. 3-4 (2011): 600. 
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 One of the primary environmental implications of climate change is rising temperatures. 
On a global scale, surface temperatures have increased by approximately 0.6 °C in the period of 
1951-2010.6 This change has had impacts on all regions of the world. Research predicts that 
temperatures will rise further in the coming decades. Climate change scholar Jason Evans 
predicts that average temperatures in the Middle East will have risen by 1.41 °C by 2050, and 
3.95 °C by 2100.7 Another study by the Cyprus Institute concluded that temperatures will rise 
more significantly, up to 5 °C by mid-century.8 Regardless of the exact number, scientists across 
the board are preparing for a significant temperature rise in MENA in the coming century. There 
are many environmental consequences to this temperature increase. MENA will experience an 
increase in hot days and nights per year of about two to four weeks, and heat waves will become 
more common (in recent years, the maximum temperature on the hottest days of the year was 
about 43 °C).9 A recent study by the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry in Germany and the 
Cyprus Institute found that summer temperatures in MENA will be “increasing at a pace more 
than two times faster than the average pace of global warming.”10 This study also concluded that 
if climate change continues at this pace, the Middle East could become “uninhabitable,” with 
summer temperatures reaching 46° C during the day, and heat waves occurring ten times more 
frequently than they do today.11 This warming trend will affect human health, agricultural yields 
and livestock industries in the region.12 This trend is expected to be most extreme over the 
                                               
6 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014–Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: 
Regional Aspects (Cambridge University Press, 2014): 6. 
7 Jason P. Evans, "21st century climate change in the Middle East," Climatic Change 92, no. 3-4 (2009): 431. 
8 Cyprus Institute, 2. 
9 J. Lelieveld et al, "Strongly Increasing Heat Extremes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the 21st 
Century," Climatic Change 137 , no. 1-2 (2016): 245. 
10 Frangoul, Anmar. “Climate change could make North Africa and Middle East ‘uninhabitable’.” CNBC, May 4, 
2016.  
11 Frangoul. 
12 Cyprus Institute, 3. 
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Levant, which includes Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Israel, and on the North African 
Coast.13 Figure 1 shows the increasing daytime summer temperature in various MENA cities by 
the end of the century. 
 
Climate change will also impact water resources in the Middle East. Many states in the 
MENA Region have already begun to experience changes in precipitation levels due to climate 
change. The Levant region is currently experiencing the worst drought in 900 years as a result of 
climate change.14 According to a NASA study, this drought, which began in 1998, was made 
worse by human-induced climate change.15 Renewable water resources have become 
increasingly scarce since the onset of the 21st century, with decreasing rates of recharge. This is 
a result of changes in precipitation and evapotranspiration due to climate change as well as 
                                               
13 Cyprus Institute, 6. 
14Benjamin Cook et. al., "Spatiotemporal drought variability in the Mediterranean over the last 900 years," Journal 
of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres (2016): 2060.. 
15 Ellen Gray, “NASA Finds Drought in Eastern Mediterranean Worst of Past 900 Years,” National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, March 1, 2016. 
Figure 1.Observed and Projected temperature trends across the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East 
Region. Source: Cyprus Institute. 
 
6 
population growth putting pressure on water resources. Figure 2 shows the projections for water 
availability per capita in MENA countries by the year 2025. According to data from the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization, the MENA region has the world’s lowest levels of actual 
renewable water resources per capita, at 55.43 m3 as of 2014.16 This marks an astounding 




Figure 2. Projections for water availability per capita in 2025 in MENA countries. Source: Climatic Change (2011). 
 
Extreme droughts such as the one the Levant is currently experiencing are expected to 
become more common in the remainder of the 21st century. The Cyprus Institute predicts that 
“overall rainfall is predicted to decrease by 20-30%” and “Mediterranean precipitation may 
significantly decrease in winter along the eastern Mediterranean coast by between 30-50%” by 
                                               
16 “Water is Focus of Climate Change in Middle East and North Africa,” World Bank.  
17 World Bank. 
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the end of the century.18 Evans projects a decrease in precipitation of over 8 mm by the year 
2050.19 The overall decrease in precipitation will correspond with an increase in the frequency of 
droughts and other extreme weather conditions. The MENA region, which is already under 
significant water stress in an age of economic development and population growth, will face 
even greater water scarcity because of climate change. Many countries in the region, particularly 
those in the Persian Gulf, are expected to completely run out of renewable water resources by 
mid-century.20 The Gulf States have already depleted much of their water resources because of 
development and urbanization—climate change will exacerbate this problem.21 The decrease in 
water resources will affect human health, biodiversity, and agricultural productivity. On a related 
note, climate change is expected to increase the probability of desertification in MENA.22 
Desertification is a process in which drylands are persistently degraded, causing loss in arable 
land. Climate change has already caused increased desertification on a global scale, and the 
MENA region is especially vulnerable because of its natural aridity and proximity to desert. 
Climate change is projected to have significant effects on agriculture in the MENA 
region. The increase in the number of hot days during the summer could lower the productivity 
of crops, especially major rainfed crops in the region such as cereal, fruits, and vegetables.23 The 
increase in evapotranspiration and corresponding decrease in soil moisture could significantly 
reduce land suitability for agriculture.24 The decrease in agricultural productivity as a result of 
                                               
18 Cyprus Institute, 6. 
19 Evans, 426. 
20 Jonathan Chenoweth et. al., "Impact of climate change on the water resources of the eastern Mediterranean and 
Middle East region: Modeled 21st century changes and implications," Water Resources Research 47, no. 6 (2011): 
9. 
21 Chenoweth, 1. 
22 Sowers et. al, 600. 
23 Cyprus Institute, 9. 
24 Cyprus Institute, 9. 
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climate change will directly affect the economic health and food security in the MENA region. 
Agriculture has traditionally played a key role in the economic development of MENA countries, 
with a large portion of the population employed in agriculture.25 According to the World Bank, 
approximately 23.4% of the population in the broader region of MENA were employed in 
agriculture as of 2010, with some countries such as Morocco reaching 40% employment in 
agriculture.26 A 2009 study found that climate change could result in up to a 39% decrease in rice 
production in MENA by 2050, along with decreases in production of wheat, maize, and millet.27 
Climate Change and Conflict 
 Climate change and environmental degradation are linked with regional conflicts and 
political unrest, particularly in water-scarce regions like the Middle East. Though a direct causal 
link between environmental degradation and political security threats is a contentious issue 
among experts, environmental factors are widely regarded as potential threat multipliers in these 
conflicts.28 This means that while political and social factors may be the direct cause of unrest, 
environmental factors such as water shortages or reduced agricultural productivity can fuel and 
exacerbate these conflicts. A 2014 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), commissioned by the United Nations, asserted that “climate change can indirectly 
increase risks of violent conflicts in the form of civil war and inter-group violence by amplifying 
well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks.”29 
                                               
25 John Dixon et. al., “Farming Systems and Poverty: Improving Farmers’ Livelihoods in a Changing World,” 
Washington D.C.: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States and The World Bank (2001): 87. 
26  “Employment in Agriculture (% of total employment),” International Labor Organization, The World Bank 
(2010), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=ZQ. 
27 Gerald C Nelson et, al., Climate change: Impact on agriculture and costs of adaptation, Vol. 21, International 
Food Policy Research Institute, 2009: 9. 
28 Balgis Osman Elasha, Mapping of Climate Change Threats and Human Development Impacts in the Arab Region, 
United Nations Development Program Bureau of Arab States (New York: UN, 2010): 26. 
29  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014–Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: 
Summary for Policymakers (Cambridge University Press, 2014): 20. 
 
9 
Environmental degradation can also have a direct impact on the economic health of a country, 
which can also play a key role in political unrest.30 Many scholars argue that the consequences of 
climate change for political security depend more on the willingness and ability of governments 
to handle the social and financial burden of addressing environmental changes than the changes 
themselves.31 Though a causal relationship has not been proven, the current literature asserts that 
climate change and climate-related disasters can have widespread implications for political and 
social issues such as migration, economic productivity, and public health. In regions like MENA 
that have weak governance and limited financial resources, consequences are especially tangible. 
Climate-related problems like water scarcity have historically led to regional conflicts in MENA, 
and the effects of climate change in the coming years only stands to exacerbate these issues. 
 The 2007 IPCC noted that climate hazards act as a stress factor that could induce security 
risks and violent conflicts.32 The German Advisory Board on Climate Change asserted in a 2007 
study that “climate change will draw ever-deeper lines of division and conflict in international 
relations, triggering numerous conflicts between and within countries over the distribution of 
resources, especially water and land, over the management of migration, or over compensation 
payment.”33 Literature on the causal link between climate change and conflict is inconclusive, 
but there are many studies on climate change as a threat multiplier. One such report, jointly 
published by the European Commission and the High Representative for the Common and 
Foreign Security Policy, notes that climate change “threatens to overburden states and regions 
                                               
30 Lelia Croitoru and Maria Sarraf, The Cost of Environmental Degradation: Case Studies from the Middle East and 
North Africa (Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 2010): 1. 
31 Jürgen Scheffran and Antonella Battaglini, "Climate and conflicts: the security risks of global warming," 
Regional Environmental Change 11, no. 1 (2011): 29. 
32 Scheffran and Battaglini, 27. 
33 Scheffran and Battaglini, 28. 
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which are already fragile and conflict prone.”34 A report commissioned by the UN Development 
Program Bureau of Arab States found that the environmental stresses of climate change are 
likely to exacerbate the existing animosities in the Arab region, especially in countries suffering 
from political instability.35 Ellen Messer of Oxfam America asserts that “climate change will 
transform resource bases and so produce conflict (i.e., competition) over access to land, water, 
and other resources.”36 The spectrum of interpretations differ when it comes to whether this 
phenomenon leads to violence or cooperation; and whether the root cause of such violence is 
environmental or political.37  
One prominent area of study in the realm of environmental security is the study of water 
conflicts. The concept of water conflicts is particularly relevant to the MENA region, and there 
have been many studies of political and social uprisings that are rooted in disputes over water 
resources. Access to water becomes a national security risk when demand for water outweighs 
supply; and in regions with little to no renewable water resources left, there is significant 
potential for social discontent that could escalate into an armed conflict. Experts cite the Arab-
Israeli disputes over access to water resources in the Jordan River Basin as an example of how 
environmental factors can exacerbate existing ethnic tensions.38 Population growth and economic 
development are occurring in MENA at the same time as climate change, which has significant 
implications for demand for water resources. Between 1950 and 2000, the population of the 
                                               
34 European Commission, “Climate Change and International Security: Paper from the High Representative and 
European Commission to the European Council,” March 14, 2008: 1. 
35 Elasha, 36. 
36 Ellen Messer, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict: A critical literature review,” Oxfam America: Research 
Backgrounders (2010): 6. 
37 Messer, 6. 
38 Miriam Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995): 19. 
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MENA region increased from around 100 million to around 380 million.39 Population increased 
by 3.7 times during this time period, surpassing all other world regions.40 Thus, many countries 
in the region entered the 21st century with rapidly increasing demand for water and rapidly 
decreasing supply. This combination of climate change and economic development poses a 
significant security challenge for the MENA countries.41  
Water scarcity also has implications for agricultural activity, which can also act as a 
threat multiplier. Both rainfed and irrigated agriculture are dependent on the climate, and a 
hotter, drier season could mean drastically reduced agricultural productivity. Oxfam’s Ellen 
Messer found that climate change will “push populations dependent on rainfall or irrigated 
agriculture to the brink of fierce competition for productive resources.”42 As precipitation levels 
and renewable water resource levels drop because of climate change, researchers note that 
populations dependent on agriculture will find themselves in economic crisis--a stepping stone to 
migration, unrest, and protest.43 Drago Bergholt and Paivi Lujala found the occurrence of 
droughts, which are predicted to become more common because of human-induced climate 
change, have a negative relationship with economic growth, a factor which typically exacerbates 
political and social tensions in countries with weak governance and agriculture-dependent 
economies.44 Additionally, some studies have found that food insecurity as a result of reduced 
agricultural productivity can lead to violence, evidenced by the “food riots” that have occurred in 
                                               
39 Farzaneh Roudi, Population Trends and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa, (Washington, D.C.: 
Population Reference Bureau, 2001): 1.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Peter H. Gleick, "Water, drought, climate change, and conflict in Syria," Weather, Climate, and Society 6, no. 3 
(2014): 332.  
42 Messer, 12. 
43 Messer, 12. 
44 Drago Bergholt and Paivi Lujala, “Climate-Related Natural Disasters, Economic Growth, and Armed Civil 
Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 1 (2012): 16. 
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the Arab Spring countries and many African countries in the period of 2007-2008.45 Arab Spring 
protesters in Jordan, Yemen, and Tunisia waved baguettes in the air to express frustration with 
the sharp increase in food prices that resulted in part from extreme weather across the globe.46 
Increases in food prices also led to food riots in many African countries in 2007 and 2008; a 
clash between protesters and police in Mozambique left several dead and over 100 injured in 
February 2008.47 Oli Brown and Alec Crawford found that food insecurity is a pertinent threat in 
the Middle East Levant region because of pressures put on governments in the region to adapt to 
reduced agricultural yields.48 
Climate change is also projected to have impacts on migration patterns. Brzoska and 
Frölich note that climate migration is considered one of the main security risks of global 
warming.49 Many of the environmental effects of climate change could force or encourage 
migration. Robert McLeman argues that various climate change-related events, whether it be a 
natural disaster or a drought, can influence human migration.50 Henrik Urdal found that the 
increases in migration as a result of climate change can lead to “higher pressures on resources in 
areas of destination and subsequently to resource competition.”51 Brown and Crawford identified 
climate-induced migration as a security threat, noting that “shifting rainfall patterns, spreading 
desertification and falling agricultural productivity are likely to undermine rural livelihoods, 
                                               
45 Jürgen Scheffran et. al., "Climate change and violent conflict," Science 336, issue 6083 (2012): 870.  
46 Sarah Johnstone and Jeffrey Mazo, “Global Warming and the Arab Spring,” Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy 53, no. 2 (2011): 11. 
47 Julia Barazneva and David R. Lee, “Explaining the African Food Riots of 2001-2008: An Empirical Analysis,” 
Food Policy 39 (2013): 29.  
48 Oli Brown and Alec Crawford. "Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions," Climate change and the risk of violent 
conflict in the Middle East. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development (2009): 2. 
49 Michael Brzoska and Christiane Fröhlich, "Climate change, migration and violent conflict: vulnerabilities, 
pathways and adaptation strategies," Migration and Development 5, no. 2 (2016): 191. 
50 Robert A. McLeman, Climate Change and Human Migration: Past Experiences, Future Challenges (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013): 1. 
51 Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal, “Climate Change, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict,” 
Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 677. 
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worsen job prospects in rural areas and accelerate migration to urban areas.”52 This migration is 
projected to cause significant pressures on urban area services, potentially fueling resentments 
among existing urban populations.53 Research suggests that climate change-induced migrants 
have already played a significant role in regional conflicts in the MENA region, particularly the 
onset of the Syrian Civil War.54 The significance of this concept to the region will be examined 
more closely in later sections of this thesis. 
Another significant aspect of the literature on climate change’s effects on political unrest 
is the emphasis on the role of governance and mitigation strategies in addressing the security 
threats of climate change. Most studies do not conclude that climate change or environmental 
degradation will necessarily lead to violent conflict, and this is in large part due to the role of 
government mitigation. Literature suggests that the chance of violent conflict or political 
uprising can be decreased by strong preparation and mitigation efforts for the effects of climate 
change.55 Schyns and his colleagues found that in water-stressed countries, the government can 
mitigate a potential water crisis through various techniques such as changing production and 
consumption patterns and modifying agricultural techniques to reduce water demand.56 The 
German Advisory Council on Global Change states that the main cause of water crisis today is 
poor management of available resources.57 The 2014 IPCC report found that the impacts of 
climate change on societies depend on three non-climate related factors: socioeconomic 
                                               
52 Brown and Crawford, 3. 
53 Brown and Crawford, 3. 
54 Gleick, 331.  
55 Messer, 7.  
56 Joep F. Schyns et. al., "Mitigating the risk of extreme water scarcity and dependency: The case of Jordan," Water 
7, no. 10 (2015): 5710. 
57 Hans Joachim Schellnhuber et. al, Climate Change as a Security Risk, German Advisory Council on Global 
Change (Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2008): 80. 
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pathways (level of economic and human development), adaptation and mitigation actions, and 
governance.58 
There is strong evidence to suggest that wealthier, more developed nations, such as the 
United States and Western European nations, are generally capable of avoiding climate change-
related conflicts, while less developed nations are more vulnerable because they do not have the 
monetary resources and advanced technology to adapt to extreme climatic changes.59 Halvard 
Buhaug states that “economically developed and politically stable societies are well able to 
handle and adapt to conceivable environmental conditions.”60 Thus, they are able to mitigate the 
conditions that could lead to a climate-related conflict. Regions are significantly more likely to 
experience climate conflict if they are already “conflict prone,” which Brzoska and Frölich 
define as regions with extreme resource scarcity, regions with high levels of conflict, or regions 
with exclusive identities.61 Mearns and Norton further explain the characteristics of a vulnerable 
region, saying that “countries that are characterized by other conflict-promoting features--
notably, poor governance, large populations with polarized subgroups, social inequalities, a 
violent neighborhood, and a history of violence--are plausible candidates for climate-induced 
conflict.”62  
Even in less developed nations that could be considered conflict prone, the government’s 
reaction to climate change can either exacerbate or reduce the risk of an uprising. Scott 
Greenwood found that Jordan, a highly water-stressed country, was able to prevent a large scale 
uprising after years of drought through a government-sponsored system of water access that 
                                               
58 IPCC 2014, 3. 
59 Raleigh and Urdal, 675. 
60 Halvard Buhaug et al., "Implications of climate change for armed conflict," Social dimensions of climate change: 
Equity and vulnerability in a warming world (2010): 81.  
61 Brzoska and Fröhlich, 203. 
62 Buhaug, 81. 
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relies primarily on patron-client links.63 Similarly, Niger experienced numerous climate-related 
disasters in 2010 that devastated agricultural output, but was able to avoid large-scale protests 
after the government set up a cabinet-level ministry to control food prices and implemented a 
massive aid operation.64 On the other hand, mismanagement of water and land resources by the 
Syrian government contributed to political unrest prior to the civil war.65 Experts emphasize the 
importance of environmental governance in the coming years as a way to mitigate potential 
conflicts, but also recognize the difficulty in implementing environmental policies in unstable 
and impoverished regions. A UNDP Bureau of Arab States report asserted the need for the Arab 
states to implement climate change adaptation strategies related to good governance, human 
resources, institutional structures, public finance, and natural resource management in order to 
prevent further socioeconomic and security impacts.66 Since many states in MENA suffer from 
instability and conflict, implementation of such strategies could prove extremely difficult. 
Argument Overview and Methods 
 Before delving into the relationship between climate change, government response, and 
civil unrest, it is important to understand why this relationship matters. As climate change 
continues to disrupt the environment in the coming years, understanding its implications for civil 
conflict is vital. As mentioned earlier, climate change is predicted to worsen in the near future, 
and if there is indeed a relationship between climate conditions and conflict, this could have 
enormous consequences for global security. It is also important to understand the complexities of 
both the effects of climate change and the existence of civil unrest in the Middle East. While 
                                               
63 Scott Greenwood, "Water insecurity, climate change and governance in the Arab world," Middle East Policy 21, 
no. 2 (2014): 141. 
64 Barazneva and Lee, 35. 
65 Ulrika Åkesson and Knud Falk. “Climate Change in Syria–trends, projections and implications,"Sida’s Helpdesk 
for Environment and Climate Change (2015): 5. 
66 Elasha, 31. 
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there is no simple explanation of climate-related conflict in the Middle East, this thesis will 





With climate change as an antecedent condition, government response acts as an independent 
variable, with the intensity of civil unrest as the dependent variable. As shown in the diagram 
above, citizens’ access to vital resources constitutes the intervening variable. This is an important 
component of the argument because when a significant portion of the population does not have 
access to vital resources such as food, water, and income, a humanitarian crisis can occur, which 
is a primary driver of civil unrest. In MENA, climate change puts a strain on natural resources, 
notably water and agricultural output. The government response to these conditions determines 
how resource scarcity will affect their populations. There are varying degrees of government 
response to climate change that each have different effects on the population. Absence of 
government adaptation efforts can result in intense resource scarcity, which in turn leads to 
competition, migration, financial crisis, and other factors that directly increase civil unrest. 
Government adaptation strategies, like importing water to offset a drought or adjusting food 
 
17 
prices during a global wheat shortage, can appease discontent populations and prevent the 
outbreak of violence. Some government environmental policies not only fail to address the 
impacts of climate change, but actually make them worse, such as implementing agricultural 
quotas that prioritize unsustainable agricultural practices. These types of policies can also lead to 
migration, famine, competition, and other socioeconomic problems that fuel civil unrest. 
Explanation of Variables 
 
Climate Change 
 In this study, climate change is the antecedent condition that activates the hypothesis. The 
causal relationship between government response to climate change and intensity of civil unrest 
only exists in the context of a country affected by climate change. The effects of climate change, 
discussed earlier in this thesis, serve as catalysts for government response to environmental 
problems. Climate change acts as an antecedent condition in this study because it has manifested 
itself throughout the region of MENA. The effects of climate change—namely drought, 
temperature increase, and desertification—are the conditions that all regional governments are 
responding to, thus activating the causal mechanisms that lead to civil unrest. 
Government Response to Climate Change 
 Government response to climate change acts as the independent variable in this 
relationship. Government response to climate change is a broad category, but here it refers to any 
specific government actions meant to lessen or mitigate the environmental or social impacts of 
climate change, as well as policies that relate to the environmental degradation. The success or 
   











failure of government response to climate change is what will activate a chain of events that can 
lead to civil unrest in MENA. As mentioned in Section I, there are many factors that can lead to 
civil unrest in this region. However, in this study of climate change-induced conflict, government 
response is the independent variable. There are several intervening variables that follow from the 
independent variable to influence the intensity of civil unrest, the dependent variable. 
Access to vital resources 
The relationship between government response to climate change and civil unrest lies in 
the population’s access to vital resources, which here constitutes the intervening variable. This is 
the mechanism that is closely related to level of government response and will cause the 
dependent variable, the intensity of civil unrest. Vital resources include food, water, shelter, and 
livelihood. These are resources needed for every human to meet their basic needs. As climate 
change often leads to resource scarcity (of land, water, and agricultural output), it falls on the 
government to offset this scarcity and ensure its population has access to vital resources. If the 
efforts to mitigate climate change are successful, then populations will be able to meet their basic 
needs and correspondingly, avoid an increase in civil unrest. If, however, the government does 
not respond to climate change or is unsuccessful in mitigation, populations will not be able to 
meet their basic needs and may face competition over resources or a humanitarian crisis, which 
in turns leads to unrest on a significant scale. 
Approach 
 The above hypothesis will be tested using case studies in a controlled comparison. This 
thesis will analyze the cases of Syria, Tunisia, Jordan, and Sudan, looking specifically at these 
countries in the past ten years in which climate change has had clear demonstrable effects. 
Conducting these case studies will serve two purposes: first, to test the importance of the 
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antecedent condition, climate change. Second, to test the hypothesis itself, relating government 
response to the intensity of civil unrest.  
 The selected cases will reflect John Stuart Mill’s “method of difference,” in that all cases 
share general characteristics but differ greatly in the value of the independent variable of 
government response.67 The case selection for this study seeks to identify the differences in 
government response to climate change and thus reveal the causal mechanisms relating to civil 
unrest. If the hypothesis is correct, the cases in which there is no government effort to offset 
climate change, we should see a greater intensity of civil unrest. Likewise, in countries where the 
government did make a successful effort to offset climate change-induced resource scarcity, we 
should see less extreme resource scarcity, and thus less intensity of civil unrest.  
 This paper will look at Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Sudan because they share broadly-
similar characteristics in terms of culture, geography, political system, and the environmental 
impacts of climate change. In all four of these countries prior to the Arab Spring, we can see a 
non-democratic political system, large Arab populations, a patriarchal social system, the 
existence of some level of political discontent, a mid- to low-range Human Development Index, 
and similar climate change effects (namely drought, temperature increase, and desertification). 
This is also a region in which there has been a great deal of civil unrest within the last ten years 
(though not in all four countries), which correlates with the increase in climate change’s effects. 
Methodologically, these cases are suitable for examining the effects of government adaptation to 
climate change on civil unrest or lack thereof.  
 While the occurrence of civil unrest is a complex phenomenon, comparative case studies 
will allow a focused examination of the causal relationship between government response and 
                                               




civil unrest in a region greatly affected by climate change. This method of analysis will 
illuminate how government response to climate change creates a chain of reactions that can 
either lessen or exacerbate civil unrest. Another advantage of the case study method is that it 
allows us to move beyond theory and look at the actual effect of climate change governance and 
its implications. There is considerable literature that theorizes the implications of climate change 
for conflict, but the most effective way to test this is to examine tangible examples. These four 
countries have all experienced significant social and environmental impacts due to climate 
change, so they constitute an ideal set of studies to test the role of government response in 
violent conflict.  
Limitations 
While this thesis seeks to be as clear and explanatory as possible, there are limits to the 
above research approach. As previously mentioned, the dependent variable of civil unrest is not 
monocausal. There are many reasons why civil unrest has occurred in the Middle East, and this 
can be traced back to an array of social, economic, and political factors that stand alone from 
environmental stressors. These factors occur even when the population does have sufficient 
access to vital resources. Thus, it is difficult to make any sort of broad generalizations about 
unrest in the Middle East. This does not make the above hypothesis invalid, but it is important to 
keep in mind that there are other factors affecting the dependent variable. Another limitation lies 
in the fact that climate change is a relatively recent phenomenon, so data regarding government 
response to climate change (particularly in less developed regions such as the Middle East), is 
still limited. Much remains unknown about the broader implications of climate change, so this is 




Case Study: Syria 
 One of the most recent and well-documented incidences of conflict in the Middle East is 
the Syrian Civil War. Beginning in 2011 as part of the Arab Spring, the Syrian Civil War has 
caused massive civilian casualties and severe damage to the infrastructure of many cities, as well 
as a mass outflow of refugees. While the uprising was caused by several complex and 
interrelated social, political, and economic factors, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest 
that climate change played a role in exacerbating these factors. This case study will explore the 
effects of climate change in Syria, how these effects contributed to unrest, and how the Syrian 
government’s response only intensified climate change-induced resource scarcity. This paper’s 
hypothesis suggests that government response to climate change affects the intensity of civil 
unrest because of its determination of citizens’ access to vital resources. This case study will 
evaluate each variable and determine whether or not the case of Syria is congruent with this 
thesis’ hypothesis. The first section will discuss the effects of climate change in Syria, namely 
the severe drought and how it impacted agriculture. 
Climate Change in Syria 
 The climate of Syria experiences a great deal of hydrologic variability, meaning it is 
difficult to predict climate patterns, year-to-year rainfall, and water availability.68 Though the 
country is no stranger to drought, Syria experienced an extended severe drought from 2006 to 
2010 that contributed to agricultural failures, economic hardships, and population 
displacement.69 NASA placed a broader timeline on this drought, marking its initial onset in 
1998 and noting that it has been the worst drought to affect the region in 900 years.70 The length 
                                               





and severity of the drought suggests that human-induced climate change was an underlying 
cause. Syria was not the only country affected by this drought, but it was one of the hardest hit 
countries. According to a study sponsored by the UN Office for Disaster Reduction, Syria was 
one of the countries most vulnerable to drought in the Arab region, measured based on frequency 
and length of drought in the period of 2000-2010.71 In addition to the drought, Syria experienced 
a significant increase in surface temperature throughout the last century, likely the result of 
anthropogenic climate change.72 The increase in temperature corresponded with an increase in 
evaporation, which harmed winter crops such as wheat that relied on soil moisture.73 
 The severe drought had several societal implications, but one of the primary sectors 
affected was agriculture. Comprising about 20% of total GDP and employing 33% of the 
population, agriculture was a major sector of the Syrian economy, and it was especially 
vulnerable to environmental changes.74 Agriculture in Syria is also largely reliant on rainfall, 
with 71% of total agricultural areas consisting of rainfed crops.75 The agricultural season relied 
on rainfall at specific points in the cycle, so the severe, extended drought (which encompassed 
multiple growing seasons) had devastating effects on agricultural output. Two primary crops, 
wheat and barley, were especially affected by the drought. In the 2007/8 season, in which the 
drought was especially severe, 75% of farming families suffered total crop failure, and wheat and 
barley production decreased by 47% and 67% respectively compared to the previous year.76 
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Figure 3 shows the normalized difference vegetation index in 2008, which shows the amount of 
vegetation compared to normal. This shows that the majority of the country experienced 
significant vegetation loss in 2008. The effects of the agricultural failure in the 2007/8 season 
were felt throughout the country, as Syria had to import wheat for the first time in 15 years.77 
Even in the following season in which rainfall levels recovered in parts of the country, farmers 
again suffered widespread crop loss due to an outbreak of yellow wheat rust, a fungal disease 
which spread rapidly due to the prolonged drought in the previous seasons.78 The environmental 
degradation caused by the drought and temperature increase had a number of social implications. 
The following sections will explore the effects the drought and crop failure had on the Syrian 
population. 
 
Social and Economic Implications of Climate Change 
The devastation of crops and livestock during the drought was significant to Syrian 
society because agriculture accounted for 25% of the gross domestic product and employed 40% 
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of Syria’s workforce before the Arab Spring of 2011.79 The governorates most affected by the 
drought were those that employed a large population in rainfed agriculture: Al-Hasakah, Ar-
Raqqah, Aleppo, and Dier ez-Zor.80 These areas, which are all located in the northeastern part of 
the country, were already vulnerable to agricultural failures because they exhibited the highest 
proportions of rural and urban poverty.81 The UN estimated that the drought directly affected 
about 1.3 million people, and 800,000 of those were severely affected, meaning their assets and 
sources of livelihood were significantly degraded.82 As the drought extended for multiple 
seasons, growers were less and less able to cope as their incomes dropped severely—upwards of 
90% after the 2006 drought.83 Livestock herders also suffered from the drought: young livestock 
mortality rate rose by up to 30%, mating rates decreased by 60%, and many herders were forced 
to slaughter or sell their remaining livestock at reduced prices.84 The devastation of crops and 
livestock, coupled with the Syrian government response discussed below, created a large 
population that had very few options for livelihood in their hometowns. 
The drought and agricultural failures displaced a majority of the families who lived in 
northeast Syria. With a large portion of the population already living in poverty, the failure of 
agriculture pushed many families to move to urban areas in hopes of finding a new means of 
gaining income. While UN agencies estimated that the drought caused at least 300,000 people to 
move from the northeast region, some studies put the number of displaced people much higher, 
up to 1.5 million people.85 The UN estimated that in the governorates of Hassakeh and Deir ez-
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Zor, as much as 60-70% of the population deserted their home villages.86 It is likely that these 
numbers were even higher in reality since no comprehensive study of internally displaced 
persons was ever conducted.87 Rural migrants primarily moved to the outskirts of Syria’s major 
cities, including Aleppo, Damascus, Daraa, Deir es-Zour, Hama, and Homs.88 The result was the 
formation and expansion of makeshift tent settlements in the suburbs of the cities. These 
encampments were illegal and usually lacked clean water, sanitation services, and electricity.89 
The mass migration of rural families added economic stress to Syria’s cities, which were already 
burdened with rapid population growth, high unemployment, corruption, and inequality.90 From 
2002 to 2010, Syria’s urban population increased from 8.9 million to 13.8 million—more than a 
50% increase in less than ten years.91 These cities would become the site of some of the earliest 
political unrest in Syria leading up to the Arab Spring.92 The next section will examine the 
independent variable, Syrian government response to climate change, and its effects. 
The Role of Syrian Governance 
 While the drought was devastating to crop yields and livestock in Syria, it alone was not 
wholly responsible for the mass movement of internally displaced persons to cities in the years 
leading up to the Arab Spring. The drought was exacerbated by years of poor water management 
and resource exploitation, along with the Bashar Al-Assad regime’s neglect of the rural to urban 
migration crisis. The devastation of rural livelihoods was the culmination of environmental 
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stress, unsustainable use of resources, and the failure of the regime to counteract the 
environmental and humanitarian crises that had been building up for years before the drought. 
 The government’s harmful environmental policies began years before the 2006-10 
drought. Exploitation of Syria’s natural resources can be traced back to the regime of Hafez Al-
Assad. In the 1970s and 1980s, Hafez Al-Assad used policies of land redistribution, subsidies for 
agriculture, and encouragement of higher agricultural production to garner rural support for the 
regime.93 These policies encouraged rural residents to exploit the country's water and land 
resources without regard to conservation.94 Despite the naturally limited renewable water 
resources in the country, the regime implemented a vast expansion of irrigation systems that 
relied on groundwater throughout the 1980s and 1990s.95 These systems made groundwater 
cheaper to pump and more accessible as a means of irrigation.  
By the time Bashar Al-Assad came into power, rural farmers had grown to rely on 
subsidies for water-intensive crops implemented by his father, including subsidies for the diesel 
fuel that was used to pump groundwater used to irrigate crops.96 Throughout the 20th century 
and into the early 2000s, the Syrian government encouraged the use of traditional flood 
irrigation, which was extremely water intensive and significantly less efficient than modern 
irrigation methods such as drip and sprinkler irrigation.97 By the time of the 2006/7 growing 
season, groundwater resources had been severely depleted due to years of overpumping.98 Many 
other natural water resources also dried up or significantly diminished, including the Khabur 
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River in the Hassakeh governorate and the Balikh River in the Raqqa governorate as a result of 
years of unsustainable water management.99 
 Adding to decades of water mismanagement, the Bashar Al-Assad regime decided to 
implement policies of economic liberalization that would prove disastrous to rural farming 
families. These liberalization policies were short sighted and failed to consider the economic 
realities in rural areas. In 2008 and 2009, Assad abruptly cancelled several subsidies to farmers, 
which resulted in sudden price hikes in animal feed, diesel fuel, and fertilizer right before the 
growing season.100 While the cancellation of subsidies made sense from a strictly environmental 
point of view (subsidies encouraged overpumping of groundwater), farmers were left with no 
social safety net, and the policy came after the 2006/7 season when the drought had caused total 
crop failures for many families.  
The combination of drought, desertification, and cancellation of animal feed subsidies 
also led to nearly 60% of small-scale cattle farmers losing their entire herds.101 In implementing 
these liberalization policies, the Assad regime did not account for the massive losses farmers had 
already experienced, and failed to adequately address the economic devastation faced by a 
significant portion of the population. In an attempt to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, the 
government did issue two drought appeals requesting economic aid in conjunction with UN 
agencies in 2008 and 2009, but received only a fraction of the aid requested.102 The failure of 
these appeal efforts is likely related to the government’s attempt to downplay the humanitarian 
crisis on the international stage.103 As the migration crisis ensued, the regime neglected to put 
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any social safety measures in place to offset the economic strain on cities, which were already 
economically depressed and strained by recent influxes of Iraqi refugees.104 The government 
especially neglected the urban peripheries, where most rural migrants settled and the site of 
growing discontent before the Arab Spring—the informal settlements were denied any access to 
social services or economic relief efforts in the cities.105 The government’s long term 
environmental policies only exacerbated the effects of the drought, and as a growing portion of 
the population was left without a means of income, the regime only further isolated them by 
implementing economic liberalization policies.  
Civil Unrest in Syria 
 As this case study has now discussed the background of climate change and water policy 
in Syria leading up to the Arab Spring, this section will look at the beginning of civil unrest in 
Syria and evaluate its intensity. Clearly Syria has experienced a high degree of civil unrest and 
violent conflict since the dawn of the Arab Spring, but this section will examine the roots of civil 
unrest, particularly during the 2011 uprising, to better understand how they may relate to the 
other variables. 
 The Syrian Uprising began in 2011 as a series of seemingly disparate events and acts that 
coalesced into a broader nationwide movement for freedom.106 The popularity of this movement 
country-wide and the speed at which it took place suggests that Syrians experienced a high 
degree of civil unrest prior to the outbreak of protests. The spark of uprising did not begin in one 
of Syria’s urban centers, but rather, the small provincial town of Daraa, after several teenagers 
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were arrested for writing anti-regime graffiti on their school wall. Daraa had been strained in the 
preceding months by the influx of internal refugees from the northeast who had lost their 
livelihoods due to drought and the government’s lack of provisions. Though the direct spark was 
the arrest and poor treatment of the teenagers by the regime, protests were also fueled by 
economic frustrations, and inspired by popular protests in Tunisia and Egypt.107 The fact that 
protests began in Daraa suggests that the humanitarian crisis caused by drought played into the 
intensity of civil unrest in the country. The economic effects of Assad’s liberalization policies, 
including cancellation of subsidies, were also a source of discontent within society. Because his 
liberalization efforts mainly benefited the elites while the struggles of the urban poor increased, 
the original protests called for a decent standard of living in addition to fair treatment by police 
and greater political freedoms.108 
As the movement progressed and the regime cracked down violently on the peaceful 
protestors, the message became more direct, calling for the fall of the Assad regime.109 The 
regime continued to resist public pressure and violently crush protests, until the movement 
turned into a fully fledged rebellion and civil war.110 In the years since the uprising began, the 
civil war has claimed an estimated 470,000 lives, decimated major cities like Aleppo and Homs, 
and forced nearly 5 million people to flee the country as refugees.111  
Conclusions from the Syrian case 
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 This case study has demonstrated that the events in Syria support this paper’s hypothesis 
that government response to climate change affects the intensity of civil unrest. The antecedent 
condition of climate change was clearly present in the years leading up to the Syrian uprising, 
causing a severe, prolonged drought that devastated the country’s agricultural sector. Yet it was 
not simply the drought that caused the humanitarian crisis in the northeast and mass movement 
of rural families to the cities. The severity of the crisis was largely because of the government’s 
long history of unsustainable environmental practices which encouraged inefficient use of water 
and overpumping of limited groundwater resources. Environmental problems in Syria existed for 
years before the extreme drought of 2006-10, and the government’s unsustainable policies 
intensified the effect of climate change-induced drought on the agricultural sector. More 
immediately, the government exacerbated the environmental crisis by implementing 
liberalization policies that were ill-timed and failed to consider the livelihoods of families living 
in rural areas. Government policies not only neglected to address issues of climate change, but 
they actually made the situation worse by depriving families who relied on the environment any 
alternative access to vital resources when the drought caused their crops and livestock to fail.  
 
 While the uprising in Syria was the culmination of a variety of complex and interrelated 
political, economic, and social factors, the drought and the subsequent failure of the government 
to alleviate the humanitarian crisis played a definite role in exacerbating the tensions that led to 
the widespread anti-regime protests. The popular demonstrations called for major regime change, 
condemning poor economic policies and corruption. These protests were not directly fueled by 
 
Climate change + Unsustainable policies of Assad→severe drought→rural loss of 
livelihood→neglect of Assad regime→mass migration and economic stress→high degree 
of civil unrest 
Causal chain of events 
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climate change itself, but rather the failure of the government to adapt to climate change as well 
as other political and economic changes that drove protesters into the streets. 
 
Case Study: Jordan 
 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is another complex case regarding the effects of 
climate change and government response on civil unrest. Jordan shares basic characteristics with 
many of its neighbors in the region, including the other countries examined in this paper. The 
Kingdom of Jordan is non-democratic, has a predominantly Arab and Muslim population, has a 
relatively low gross domestic product, and high unemployment.112 As we will see later in this 
study, Jordan is poor in water resources and has experienced many effects of climate change in 
the past several years. However, unlike some of the other cases examined in this paper, Jordan 
has remained a relatively stable state in the past several decades. Despite sharing many 
characteristics in governance with other Arab nations, Jordan did not experience the Arab Spring 
to the same extent as many of its neighbors. While there were protests in Jordan calling for 
political and economic reforms, King Abdullah II survived the movement unscathed. The 
popular demonstrations were relatively peaceful throughout, and the protests died down as King 
Abdullah promised reforms and a path to democracy.113 This case study will examine how 
Jordan experienced climate change, how the government responded to environmental 
degradation, and the relationship with Jordan’s relatively low intensity of civil unrest. 
Climate Change in Jordan 
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 The climate of Jordan is naturally arid and semi-arid, and climate change has only 
worsened water scarcity. Jordan is the fourth poorest nation in the world regarding water 
resources, and it is the most water-stressed country in the Arab region.114 Precipitation is highly 
variable across different regions of the country; portions of the northwest receive upwards of 300 
millimeters of rainfall per year while the largest portion of the country in the south and east 
receive less than 100 millimeters of rainfall per year.115 Like Syria, Jordan was hit with a severe 
drought in the early 2000s that lasted over multiple seasons and devastated agriculture.116 A 2015 
study found that from the years 1995 to 2013, Jordan experienced a decrease in rainfall of an 
average of 1.2 millimeters each year.117 Another study found that since the year 1970, Jordan has 
faced frequent non-uniform periods of drought that have increased in length and severity, 
including one extreme drought that lasted for two consecutive years in 1999-2000.118 In its 
Second National Communication (SNC) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Jordan reported a decrease in precipitation by 5-20% in the majority of the country over the 45 
years preceding 2009.119  This is significant because Jordan relies mainly on precipitation for 
maintaining the country’s internal water resources.120 Decline in rainfall is also linked with a 
decline in the recharge rates of underground aquifers, which lowers groundwater availability.121 
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The SNC also reported increasing trends in the annual maximum temperature by between 0.3 
and 1.8°C, while the annual minimum temperature increase of between 0.4°C and 2.8°C since 
1965.122  Jordan also experienced a decrease in relative humidity over the 45-year period along 
with an increase in evaporation.123 Climate change is expected to continue to have effects in 
Jordan, and the country anticipates a further rise in average temperature, especially during the 
warmer months of the year, and an increase in precipitation variability, though the exact effects 
of this are difficult to project.124 
 The effects of climate change in Jordan thus far have mainly impacted the country’s 
water supply and its agricultural sector. The climate change-induced periods of drought and 
temperature increase have combined with rapid population growth and other anthropogenic 
pressures on the environment to result in serious environmental degradation throughout the 
country, including of surface water. The Jordan River, which flows through Jordan into the Dead 
Sea, now constitutes little more than a trickle by the time it discharges into the Dead Sea.125 This 
has contributed to a significant drop in the water levels in the Dead Sea.126 The flow of the 
Jordan River was never particularly substantial, and it has now been significantly depleted due to 
massive withdrawals for irrigation, population growth, and drought.127  
Social and Economic Implications of Climate Change in Jordan 
Similar to other cases, climate change has many social and economic implications in 
Jordan. Competition over scarce water resources has contributed to transboundary conflicts with 
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Israel, and to this day many Jordanians blame the water scarcity on Israel.128 As climate change 
continues to exacerbate water scarcity in the region, it is likely that tensions with Israel will 
remain high. Water scarcity also poses internal difficulties for the population, especially because 
of Jordan’s rapidly increasing population and recent influx of Syrian refugees. The demand for 
water resources has only increased as water availability has diminished. A 2015 study found that 
groundwater consumption in Jordan is nearly double the groundwater recharge rate.129 The 
overdrawing of groundwater lowers the water table and increases salinity in the remaining 
groundwater, making it unusable. Out of Jordan’s twelve aquifers, the Jordanian Ministry of 
Water and Irrigation estimates that ten are being over-exploited.130 
The agricultural sector uses the largest portion of groundwater resources in Jordan, so it 
is especially affected by climate change and its impacts. Climate change has added to a vicious 
cycle of water degradation and consumption for agriculture in Jordan. Climate change coupled 
with population pressures has led to reductions in quantities of in surface water and high rates of 
water pollution, which has forced many farmers to rely exclusively on groundwater resources.131 
This adds to the problem of over-exploitation of Jordan’s scant groundwater resources. Climate 
change-induced drought has also increased reliance on irrigation for agriculture, putting further 
pressure on groundwater. It is important to note that Jordan’s agricultural sector is much smaller 
than many of its neighbors—agriculture accounts for only 4.2% of the GDP and employs only 
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2% of the population.132 Thus, the social implications of agricultural failures in Jordan were 
more limited than countries such as Syria. 
Climate change also poses a risk to human health in Jordan, primarily because of water 
scarcity. The World Health Organization projected that water scarcity and its secondary effects 
constitute the highest priority threat to health in Jordan, and linked lower per capita water 
consumption with more incidences of diarrhea.133 The severe water scarcity is also encouraging 
reuse of wastewater as an alternative water source, especially for agricultural purposes.134 This 
poses a number of concerns for public health, including an increase in intestinal diseases and 
increased exposure to toxic chemicals for farmers, communities, and consumers.135 
Jordan’s resource scarcity and the onset of climate change have major implications for 
the economy. With water resources declining so rapidly, Jordan imports a large share of its 
water. This is both in the literal sense that it relies on shared water resources with neighboring 
countries, and in the sense of virtual water imports, which consist of all water consumption 
associated with producing imported goods. When including virtual water resources, Jordan 
imports 86% of water resources, and has become very reliant on foreign imports of water-
intensive commodities such as wheat.136 Jordan relies on imports for other needs as well, notably 
food and energy.137 Climate change has also affected Jordan externally, with the global rise in 
food prices in 2010. While the sharp price increase was due to a combination of factors, climate 
change played a definite role; Russia and the Ukraine, who export about a third of the world’s 
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wheat, suffered major crop failures in 2010, causing a price hike.138 As Jordan is a major 
importer of cereals, Jordanians felt the effects of the price increase acutely.139 
 
The Role of Jordanian Governance 
 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has taken a fairly active role in addressing climate 
change—or at least in expressing concern over climate change—in the past several years. King 
Abdullah, along with other government leaders, has noted the importance of climate policy, 
especially on the international stage. Jordan has signed onto multiple international agreements, 
including the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, and worked with international organizations to draft and implement environmental 
adaptation projects.140 In a 2015 speech at the United Nations Climate Change Conference, King 
Abdullah spoke of the importance of addressing climate change in Jordan: 
If global climate change continues on today’s trajectory, the challenges will increase 
exponentially. These harsh realities are why Jordan has been integrating energy and 
environmental approaches into a sustainable, long-term national development strategy. In 
2013, we were the first in our region to produce a comprehensive, forward-looking 
National Climate Change Policy.141 
 
Despite Jordan’s prominent role in the international struggle against climate change, the 
government has also historically played a role in creating the environmental degradation and 
water scarcity that it is now battling. Climate change has combined with unsustainable 
environmental practices to create the challenging situation facing Jordan. While the Jordanian 
people and government are still facing many challenges due to climate change, this section will 
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demonstrate how the Jordanian government has taken steps within their means to prevent the 
kind of humanitarian crisis that has potential to occur in cases of extreme resource scarcity.  
 Historically, the Jordanian political system has used environmental policies to boost 
economic growth and garner support for the regime. Since the establishment of the country in 
1921, Jordanian governance has used access to water as a political tool; access to free water and 
cheap land was given to rural families as a means to pursue a livelihood in agriculture in 
exchange for regime support.142  Thus, over time the regime garnered a significant base of 
support in rural areas. This patron-client system continued over time along with government 
subsidies for food, energy, and water that rural families rely on to maintain their standard of 
living.143 While this was an effective method of securing political support, it also increased 
exploitation of the country’s naturally scarce water resources, and created the mentality among 
farmers that water is a “free resource.”144  
The government further encouraged the growth of agriculture in the 1970s with the 
establishment of the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), a development program for agriculture in 
the area.145 The JVA implemented modern irrigation techniques such as drip irrigation, plastic-
tunnel technologies and sprinkler irrigation, which was more water-efficient than traditional 
flood irrigation.146 The implementation of modern technology increased the efficiency of 
irrigation in the Jordan Valley from 40% to nearly 75%.147 After the success of this program, the 
government tried to implement similar programs in other rural areas in the north over time, but 
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these programs promoted unsustainable use of groundwater and well-drilling, since groundwater 
is the only source of irrigation for many areas outside the Jordan Valley.148 
 As the water scarcity in Jordan increases with over-exploitation of groundwater and the 
onset of drought, the government implemented a groundwater control law in 2002 to reduce 
groundwater extraction rates and promote water conservation.149 However, this law was heavily 
influenced by farmers and agricultural interest groups, resulting in relatively loose restrictions 
and weak enforcement mechanisms.150 In more recent years, after the severe drought of 2006-10 
and the onset of the Arab Spring, the government of Jordan implemented more concrete actions 
to address climate change. In 2010, Jordan implemented a water and environmental protection 
program including law enforcement mechanisms, which the World Bank notes as significant 
since it is the “first of its kind in the region.”151 In 2013, Jordan launched a National Climate 
Change Policy for 2013-2020, aimed at lowering the nation’s emissions of greenhouse gases as 
well as securing “that the people and the economic, social and natural systems in Jordan will not 
suffer from climate change impacts.”152 Jordan is also currently working with the USAID Water 
Reuse and Environmental Conservation project to improve industrial water management, prevent 
pollution, and promote wastewater management and reuse.153 
 While the government has been fairly outspoken about addressing climate change, 
especially in the international community, they still face many challenges in addressing the 
social and economic implications of water scarcity, especially in the coming years as climate 
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change worsens and Jordan’s population continues to put pressure on scarce resources. Jordan is 
already facing economic stress, and does not have ample resources to use to adapt to a changing 
environment, so the government will face an uphill battle in achieving their climate goals in the 
near future. 
Intensity of Civil Unrest in Jordan 
 Jordan has experienced some forms of civil unrest in the past decade, but it did not 
experience near the upheaval that many Arab countries did during the uprisings of 2011. The 
protests that took place in Jordan in early 2011 were largely in response to economic stagnation 
and rising food prices in the country. The Jordanian demonstrators called for the resignation of 
the prime minister and other political reforms, but in the early protests they did not call for the 
fall of the entire regime.154 The demonstrations did have some effects in governance: the prime 
minister Samir Rifai resigned, parliamentary elections were held two years early, and King 
Abdullah promised some governmental reforms. There is still some debate regarding why the 
Arab Spring did not take as strong of a hold in Jordan as in other countries, and why Jordan has 
remained stable in the midst of its neighbors falling into conflict. The answers to these questions 
are complex, but one factor is that the intensity of civil unrest was simply not as strong as in 
other nations. This can be attributed to a number of factors, including that the government was 
less repressive than in neighboring countries. However, it is also significant that the government 
was able to maintain water access during times of drought and climatic change. 
Conclusions from the Jordanian Case 
 This case study has examined the antecedent condition of climate change in Jordan along 
with the variables of government response to climate change and intensity of civil unrest. The 
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Jordanian case is interesting because prior to the Arab uprisings of 2011, Jordan resembled many 
of its neighbors, including in terms of the effects of climate change. Jordan experienced the same 
drought as Syria and is naturally even more water poor than the other Arab countries. However, 
it had a remarkably different experience with the popular demonstrations of 2011 than its 
neighbors, and the monarchy of Abdullah II remains intact today without making any major 
sacrifices in political power. Even the protests that did occur often did not express the same “fall 
of the regime” message that was the motto of the other movements. The explanation for this is 
complex, but the events in Jordan support this paper’s hypothesis that government response to 
environmental degradation affects the intensity of civil unrest. The above analysis of Jordanian 
governance found that Jordan has taken a much more active role in addressing climate change 
than any of its neighbors. And while environmental policy has historically contributed to the 
extreme water scarcity Jordan now faces, the government began to address the overconsumption 
of water years before the drought reached its most severe point. The government also publicly 
recognizes the difficulty that water scarcity is posing on the population and has sought to relieve 
the social impacts by working with international organizations to implement mitigation and 
adaptation plans. Jordan has also maintained some social safety nets in the face of rising food 
prices, including the continuation of some subsidies and a great deal of international aid. Jordan 
has, thus far, managed to avoid major conflict or humanitarian crises caused by water scarcity.  
This case leaves many questions for the future of the country. Jordan has by no means 
solved its water crisis. The government has recognized the precarious state of its water resources 
and expressed intentions to implement more efficient water management and conservation 
techniques in the coming years as part of its climate change policy. However, Jordan is also 
facing a myriad of economic and social challenges that could complicate water conservation 
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efforts. The massive influx of refugees and Jordan’s high young adult population is putting even 
greater pressure on water resources. The government of Jordan is also facing pressures to cancel 
subsidies on fuel and food given the rise in global prices, which, if implemented, will pose a 
challenge for Jordanians who rely on these subsidies.155 As climate change continues to affect 
both Jordan’s internal water resources and the prices of imported goods, the government will 
have to remain active in adapting to the environmental, social, and economic implications of 
climate change. 
Case Study: Tunisia 
 Tunisia is an interesting case study of climate change and civil unrest, because although it 
shares many characteristics with the other cases, it also had a different experience in the 2011 
Arab uprisings than most of its neighbors. Tunisia is one of the few Arab countries that saw an 
uprising that led to a relatively peaceful transition in power that has maintained stability, albeit 
somewhat precariously, to the present. While the events of the 2010-2011 uprising suggest a high 
degree of civil unrest existed in Tunisia, there is not a great deal of literature to suggest that this 
was directly influenced by climate change. Climate change did have an effect on Tunisia prior to 
2011, but the regime of Ben Ali actually took some measures to address its impact on food prices 
and the environment. Still, the massive civil uprisings that took place in Tunisia called for the 
fall of the regime. Though there is no scholarly consensus on a link between climate change and 
the Arab Spring in Tunisia, climate change remains a highly relevant issue for Tunisia today, and 
Tunisia’s new constitution is one of few in the world to explicitly mention the importance of 
climate protection.156 This case study will analyze the effects of climate change in Tunisia, its 
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social and economic implications, possible impacts on civil unrest in the 2011 Arab Spring, and 
the role of Tunisian environmental governance before and after the uprising. 
Climate Change in Tunisia 
 Like its North African neighbors, Tunisia is naturally sensitive to climate change because 
of its semi-arid climate and its proximity to the desert.157 Similarly, Tunisia experiences high 
annual precipitation variability, ranging from 800 mm per year in the north to 150 mm per year 
in the South.158 This variability is in part due to Tunisia’s climatic diversity, with a 
Mediterranean climate in the north, a semi-arid region in central and east Tunisia, and arid desert 
in the south.159 The effects of climate change in Tunisia have been fairly congruent with global 
and regional trends. A World Bank study found that throughout the 20th century, the mean 
annual temperature in Tunisia rose by 1.4°C, with most of that increase occurring since the 
1970s.160 Some localities experienced even greater warming, such as the capital of Tunis, where 
average temperatures rose by about 3°C over the course of the 20th century.161 Because of 
Tunisia’s natural precipitation variability, it is difficult to determine overall precipitation trends, 
but the World Bank estimated a 5% decline in precipitation since the 1950s.162 Climate change’s 
effects on precipitation have varied across the country—Western Tunisia in particular has 
experienced declining rainfall, while Eastern Tunisia has seen a decline in spring rainfalls but an 
overall increase in winter rainfalls (winter is usually fairly dry in this region).163 Tunisia was hit 
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by a prolonged drought, the worst in centuries, in 1999-2002 which was part of the larger drying 
trend to hit the Middle East and North Africa region in the early 2000s.164 
 Another notable effect of climate change in Tunisia is sea level rise. Sea levels in the 
Mediterranean basin have been rising at an average of 3.1 millimeters per year since 1992, which 
has caused increased soil salinization in coastal regions of Tunisia.165 Groundwater levels are 
also affected by climate change and other forms of environmental degradation. Tunisia’s 
renewable freshwater resources, most of which are in the form of groundwater, have been 
steadily declining in the past several decades. According to data from the World Bank, 
renewable water resources have gone from 963 to 381 cubic meters per capita since 1962.166 The 
decline and deterioration of groundwater resources is due partly to climate change, but more so 
to unsustainable withdrawals to meet agricultural and population needs. The quality of 
groundwater has declined along with the quantity. Aquifers in coastal Tunisia have deteriorated 
significantly due to salinization, which is caused by sea level rise and overpumping.167 Current 
groundwater extraction rate in shallow aquifers is 97% of the annual recharge rate and 73% of 
the annual recharge rate in deep aquifers. This unsustainable use of groundwater is only 
exacerbated by climate change, which both slows the recharge rate and in the event of drought, 
creates greater demand for groundwater. In turn, lowered groundwater levels are more vulnerable 
to climate change impacts such as drought and sea level rise-induced salinization. 
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Extreme weather events have also increased in Tunisia as a result of climate change. The 
North African region has seen an increase in warm nights and days per year, and an increase in 
the number of days with heavy rainfall.168 This corresponds with a general increase in variability 
of weather and precipitation because of climate change (see Figure 4). Though there is not 
enough data to infer trends, there have been several notable incidences of fatal flash floods in the 
country since 1986.169 In the past several years, Tunisia has experienced prolonged periods of 
drought alternating with periods of floods.170 
 
Figure 4. Mean Sea Level Change in the Mediterranean, 1992-2011. 
Social and Economic Implications of Climate Change 
 Like most of the MENA region, Tunisia experiences natural water scarcity because of its 
arid and semi-arid climate. With an increase in extreme weather events such as droughts and a 
decrease in overall precipitation, Tunisia has faced higher water scarcity in the past few years, 
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though not on the scale of countries in the Levant region.171 Similar to other cases, water scarcity 
has immediate implications for the agriculture industry. In Tunisia, agriculture accounts for 11% 
of the Gross National Product (as of 2012), and employs 18% of the labor force.172 Though this 
is not as high as in some cases, it is significant because agriculture is highly dependent on 
precipitation and agriculture consumes the largest percentage of the country’s water resources.173 
Of Tunisia’s total agricultural area, 88% is rain-fed, making it vulnerable to changes in 
precipitation.174 The main crops in Tunisia are cereals (78%), olives (4%) and tomatoes (4%).175 
Cereal and olive production are particularly sensitive to rainfall. A 2015 study found that a 1% 
decrease in rainfall led to a .79% decrease in cereal production and a 1.01% decrease in olive 
production.176 Most of Tunisia’s food exports come from rain-fed agriculture, in particular fruit 
and olives, which represent 60% of total food exports.177 The production of cereals is also 
significant to Tunisian society because, as of 2010, internal production accounted for a 
significant portion of Tunisia’s consumer needs for wheat and barley.178 
Droughts have already posed a challenge for agriculture in Tunisia. An FAO report from 
2001 reported that the severe drought that began in 1999 caused overall agricultural output to 
decline by 4.9% and cereal production to decline by 43%.179 The erratic precipitation patterns 
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caused by climate change also pose a challenge for agriculture; the alternating periods of drought 
and flooding cause soil erosion and  damage to crops and buildings.180 
Not only does climate change affect local crop yields in Tunisia, but it also affects 
imported foods. Tunisia is a net importer of most food items, so it is also vulnerable to the effects 
of climate change in other parts of the world.181 Though the Tunisian government has put in 
place some safety measures to stabilize food prices during global food crises, it is still affected 
by global changes in food prices. A 2010 drought in Russia—one of the main global exporters of 
wheat—caused a global spike in food prices that was felt acutely in the North African region 
where wheat is mostly imported.182 According to data from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Food Price Index—a measure of monthly change 
in international prices for a basket of food commodities—rose from 160.3 in 2009 to 229.9 in 
2011.183 This was even more pronounced in the food price index for cereals, which rose from 
170.2 in 2009 to 240.9 in 2011.184  
However, this global change did not affect Tunisian consumer food prices to the same 
extent as some other countries. The most pronounced food price increase in Tunisia actually 
occurred in 2008 when rice prices rose in response to a global price hike (which is also thought 
to be heavily influenced by drought in rice-producing countries, notably Australia). In response 
to this price spike, riots broke out in the town of Redeyef.185 Following this, rice prices remained 
high but most other food stables maintained a steady price, even in during the global food crisis 
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in 2010-2011.186 However, an influx of refugees from Libya (which was more directly impacted 
by the food crisis) and the national economic slowdown led to increased food insecurity in parts 
of Tunisia in 2010 and 2011.187 
Climate change also poses a risk for human health in Tunisia. According to an IPCC 
report, climate change can increase the incidences and range of leishmaniasis, a parasitic disease 
that has become a significant problem in North Africa in recent years.188 Outbreaks of the disease 
have already become more frequent in Tunisia, and it emerged as an epidemic in 1991. Because 
leishmaniasis outbreaks are associated with associated with decreasing rainfall and higher 
minimum temperature, climate change is making North Africa more susceptible to spreading 
diseases.189 Other diseases such as malaria and dengue fever are expected to resurge due to 
climate change.190 
The Role of Tunisian Governance 
The Tunisian government both before and after the revolution took some steps to address 
the social and economic impacts of climate change. In response to three serious droughts that 
occurred between 1987 and 2002, the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali government incorporated water 
resource management plans into its Five-Year development plans in in 1987, 1992, and 2002. 
These plans emphasized more sustainable water use, including the implementation of treated 
wastewater in irrigation.191 Though this did not prevent exploitation of groundwater resources, 
the Five-Year plans did prioritize maintaining sources of clean water for agricultural use. Tunisia 
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has also been ahead of most other North African countries in terms of technological capabilities, 
which has increased the viability of irrigation and water management systems.192   
The Tunisian government has maintained fairly tight controls on water resources since 
independence. The Tunisian Water Code of 1975 centralized water management under the 
control of the government and did away with community self-management of water resources.193 
With the help of foreign investment, the government developed an extensive system of dams, 
water improvement systems, and irrigation systems in the 1970s and 1980s.194 These 
advancements made water management more efficient and sustainable. Overall, Tunisia has 
developed a much more robust system of water infrastructure that has, thus far, prevented any 
major crisis from occurring because of climate change. 
In more recent years, the government of Tunisia has acknowledged the importance of 
addressing climate change on the international stage. In 2007, Tunisia hosted an international 
conference on environmental investment and a conference on climate change strategies in Africa 
and the Mediterranean.195 Ben Ali’s regime signed several international agreements on climate 
change and enacted numerous regulations, but some speculate that his environmental policy was 
more for show than a genuine effort to protect the environment.196 Tunisia ratified the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1993 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1992. 197 
Despite these agreements, Eric Goldstein, research director for the Middle East and North Africa 
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at Human Rights Watch, speculated that government-owned heavy industry operated outside of 
environmental regulations with no consequences throughout Ben Ali’s rule.198 
The government that replaced Ben Ali’s regime, implemented in 2014, has continued to 
emphasize environmental protection. With the adoption of a new constitution in 2014, Tunisia 
became one of few countries in the world to mention climate change in their constitution, stating 
in article 45 that “The state guarantees the right to a healthy and balanced environment and the 
right to participate in the protection of the climate.”199 Though this is a significant step on the 
domestic and international stage, it remains to be seen if implementation of this constitutional 
provision will be effective in protecting Tunisian environment and population from the growing 
threats of climate change.200 The Tunisian Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable 
Development has created multiple strategic action plans for adaptation to climate change, 
primarily in the realm of agriculture, public health, and tourism; however, they currently lack the 
“funding, information, awareness, and communication” at both the public and leadership levels 
to fully implement these plans.201 
Civil Unrest in Tunisia 
 Tunisia played a central role in sparking the Arab Spring of 2011, and it has been one of 
the only countries to see a peaceful transition to democracy that has continued to the present. 
There is no question that civil unrest was very high in Tunisia leading up to the uprising; after a 
street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in December of 2010, protests 
erupted in his hometown and quickly spread throughout the country. These protests called for the 
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fall of the Ben Ali regime.202 The story that spread rapidly across the country was that Bouazizi 
self-immolated after being humiliated and abused by the police when they took away his produce 
cart. This story encapsulated the grievances of many Tunisians against the government. 
Frustrated with political corruption, economic stagnation, and police abuse, Tunisians used 
Bouazizi as the rallying cry for anti-regime protests throughout the country. 
Over the course of the next month, President Ben Ali attempted to quell the protests first 
by police crackdowns and later by making some concessions of power; however, his attempts 
were futile. Less than a month after Bouazizi’s self-immolation, President Ben Ali stepped down 
and fled the country. The revolution in Tunisia set off protests throughout the Arab World. The 
reasons for the massive protests that occurred are complex, but many note that prolonged 
economic stagnation and the extremely repressive policies of the Ben Ali regime combined to 
form nationwide discontent and desire for change. The transition has been messy, but Tunisia has 
maintained fairly high levels of political expression and democratic freedoms.203 
Conclusions from the Tunisian Case 
 The Tunisian case does not offer as clear of a message on the link between government 
response to climate change and civil unrest. While civil unrest was clearly very high in Tunisia, 
the connection to climate change remains a topic of debate. While the global food crisis triggered 
by climate change-induced crop failure in Russia did have a limited impact on Tunisia, the 
government did not see the same rise in food prices as much of the rest of the region, thanks in 
part to government price stabilization efforts which managed to keep wheat prices relatively 
                                               





stable.204 The Tunisian government purposely lowered prices of food staples such as sugar, milk, 
and bread in the midst of widespread protests on January 13, 2011, but this failed to placate the 
uprising.205 Tunisia has a history of food riots in rural areas, and some believe that the Ben Ali 
regime was actually too quick to dismiss the 2011 uprisings as a food riot, underestimating the 
extent of discontent in society.206  
 It is likely that though Tunisia experienced enough civil unrest to topple a regime, it was 
due more to issues of political discontent and economic stagnation than crises caused by climate 
change. The Tunisian government has showed willingness to address environmental issues on 
the international stage, and they have implemented more environmental protection policies than 
most of its neighbors. This, combined with greater water management infrastructure meant that 
drought and other climate change impacts did not cause a humanitarian crisis like the one in 
Syria. This, of course, does not prevent other political, social, and economic factors from 
creating discontent. However, further research is required on the influence of food price changes 
on civil unrest before the 2011 uprising.  
 The Tunisia case also poses many questions for the future. Tunisia has by no means 
solved its water scarcity problem, and as climate change continues to worsen, the country will 
likely face even more pressure on scarce resources. In 2016, a persistent drought hit several 
regions of Tunisia, causing widespread agricultural losses and putting pressure on the country’s 
new water reservoirs. Protests have already occurred in rural areas, with some protesters trying to 
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disrupt the flow of water to the capital.207 The government will have to put environmental 
policies at the top of its priorities as climate change continues to disrupt rural livelihoods and 
pose difficulties for ensuring access to resources throughout the country. 
Case Study: Sudan and South Sudan 
 In 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest state. After decades of bloody civil 
war, South Sudan finally gained independence from Sudan. Though Sudan’s ethnic violence has 
existed since independence in 1955, it is one of the clearest cases of a “climate conflict.” The 
main focus of this case study will be on the region of Darfur, which was both highly affected by 
climate change and the area of some of the worst violence in the civil war from 2003-2005. 
Darfur gained international attention in the early 2000s as the site of a devastating humanitarian 
crisis caused by war and malnutrition. Darfur differs from the cases of Syria, Jordan, and Tunisia 
in a few ways: only 27 of the 80 tribes in Darfur identify as Arabs, and governance before the 
creation of South Sudan was so weak that it had virtually no control over the situation in Darfur. 
However Sudan shares other characteristics with the other cases, including a history of 
colonialism, a non-democratic regime, and low economic development.208 The case of Darfur is 
important to understanding how climate change, government response, and civil unrest interact 
because it shows one of the most stark examples in history of how climate affects conflict. Even 
with the creation of two independent states, climate change continues to threaten the stability and 
livelihoods of the Sudanese people. This case study will examine how climate change affected 
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Sudan before 2011, how the government responded to the crisis, and the extent of climate-
induced civil unrest before and after the creation of South Sudan. 
Climate Change in Darfur 
Darfur lies in the West of formerly united Sudan. Before the split, Sudan was the largest 
country in Africa and encompassed a few distinct climatic zones: 29% of territory is a desert, 
19% classified as semi-desert, 27% as low rainfall savannah, 14% as high rainfall savannah, 10% 
as flood region, and less than 1% as mountain vegetation.209 Darfur includes four of these 
climatic zones, with desert and arid climate in the north, and savannah in the south.210 Similar to 
other countries in the Middle East and North African region, Sudan experiences naturally high 
levels of precipitation variability which has become more extreme with the onset of climate 
change. In the past century, Sudan has experienced numerous severe prolonged droughts. Studies 
as early as the 1980s concluded that the Darfur region was becoming drier. One of the most 
devastating droughts occurred from 1980-1984 and resulted in mass displacement and famine.211 
Darfur has continued to experience a steady decrease in precipitation levels which has caused 
desertification in many parts of the region.212 According to data from the UNEP, Darfur 
experienced a significant reduction in average annual rainfall from 1975 to 2005, in some 
regions as much as 34%.213 Though climate records in the region have only been kept since 
1917, it is likely that this scale of climate change is almost unprecedented in the history of the 
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region.214 See Figure 5 for a map of temperature and precipitation change in the region as of 
2011. 
Because of its location on the fringes of the Sahara desert and on the edge of the climate 
zones appropriate for growing rainfed crops, Darfur is extremely vulnerable to climate change 
and environmental degradation. Desertification is one of the primary threats of climate change. 
This has led to large swaths of formerly agricultural land transformed into infertile flat lands 
with little vegetative cover. A 2007 UNEP report found that three distinct desertification 
processes were underway: climate change-induced conversion of land types from semi-desert to 
desert, degradation of existing desert area, and land-type conversion from human activities such 
as overgrazing and deforestation.215 The combination of these processes has led to desertification 
becoming “Sudan’s greatest environmental problem” in the height of the civil war in the early 
2000s.216 
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Source: U.S. Geological Survey, https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/fs20113072. 
 
55 
Another adverse effect of climate change in Darfur is the increase in frequency of 
extreme weather events such as floods. Though Darfur generally experiences frequent water 
shortages, flash flooding has become more common, resulting in land erosion and destruction of 
infrastructure and agriculture.217 A UNEP study in 2007 found that “17 percent of Ganati (1,420 
ha), 25 percent of El Zouma (200 ha) and 30 percent of El Ghaba (1,215 ha) cooperative 
societies in Northern state have been swept away in flood peaks.”218 
It is important to note that some of the environmental degradation in the Darfur region is 
man-made. Deforestation has been an especially devastating occurrence in Darfur for the 
environment, because it accelerates land and water degradation and exacerbates the effects of 
climate change.219 Overgrazing and other unsustainable land use practices has contributed to the 
environmental degradation and resource scarcity in Darfur. 
Social and Economic Implications of Climate Change 
 As stated earlier, Darfur’s environment is naturally vulnerable to climate change because 
of its proximity to the desert and reliance on crops that are sensitive to rainfall. Unfortunately, 
the population of Darfur is also very vulnerable to climate change. Livestock and agriculture are 
the two pillars of Darfuris’ livelihoods and for the region’s economy. Though there are many 
distinct rural social units in Darfur, livelihoods can be separated into three main categories: 
sedentary crop-rearers, nomadic pastoralists, and owners and workers on mechanized agricultural 
schemes.220 The first two livelihoods are largely divided by ethnic group or tribe—sedentary 
farmers mostly identify as black African and the pastoralists mostly identify as Arabs. In Darfur, 
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small-scale subsistence agriculture is the primary form of agriculture. Thus, income and food 
security in Darfur are both inextricably linked with the environment.  
 Drought and desertification because of climate change in the past century has had a 
number of harmful effects on agriculture and livestock. Though there are no formal records to 
document the losses of these small-scale farming groups, a UN report estimated that 465,000 
households in Darfur would be in need of food assistance due to crop failure in 2005.221 In the 
years leading up to the early 2000s, the effects of climate change were more acute in the Darfur 
region than most of the world, and this led to lower yields and loss of arable land. As drought 
and desertification led to shrinking rangeland in the northern Darfur, nomadic Arab herders were 
also affected. Most pastoralists adapted to the loss of rangeland by moving their herds south and 
seeking more fertile land in regions traditionally occupied by sedentary crop farmers.222 
 One of the most devastating implications of drought and crop failure in Darfur was 
famine. Since Darfur had experienced multiple severe droughts in the late 20th century, it was no 
stranger to famine. The deadliest famine came after the drought of 1980-1984, and resulted in the 
death of around 176,900 Darfurians.223 Another drought year occurred in 2000-2001, leading to 
famine in parts of the region.224 With the onset of the bloodiest part of the civil war in 2003, 
famine became especially severe due to the combination of crop failures with village razing and 
other war activities. Food insecurity has become a nearly constant aspect of society in Darfur, 
even now that the war has ended. 
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Another major implication of climate change impacts on Darfur was internal 
displacement. The occurrence of drought and desertification in the north forced many herders to 
move to other regions in search of fertile land for grazing.225 Camel herders in particular have 
been gradually moving southwards into the Nuba mountains region since the 1980s.226 This 
pushed the pastoralists into areas where sedentary subsistence farmers typically lived and 
operated, creating significant tensions and land competition issues. The loss of arable land for 
agriculture has also caused internal displacement of some Southern Darfurians. With the 
escalation of civil war, the quantity of internally displaced persons (IDPs) climbed to over five 
million in 2007.227 The UN estimated that 90% of IDPs had lost their livestock due to 
environmental problems and conflict.228 The IDP crisis created environmental problems in itself, 
including deforestation, over-extraction of groundwater, and water pollution around IDP 
camps.229 
The Role of Sudanese Governance 
 Though Sudan’s government was very dictatorial throughout the civil war, it was never 
able to exercise meaningful control over the conflict. Likewise, governance failed to address the 
issues of climate change and land degradation that were compiling before escalation of the 
conflict. The ministry of environment was quite weak, and the efforts they made were mostly in 
response to pressures for food security, which meant prioritizing large-scale (and short-sighted) 
mechanized agricultural operations without regard to sustainability. Additionally, most 
environmental administration and legislation duties fell on individual state governments, and 
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state governments in the South and Darfur have “virtually no environmental administration or 
capacity whatsoever.”230 
The Sudanese government also failed to address land competition issues that naturally 
arose from drought in the years from independence to civil war. In the decades before 
independence, the Anglo-Egyptian condominium over Sudan from 1899-1955 worked with local 
leaders to establish the principle of Native Administration over land in the Darfur region.231 This 
allowed the sedentary tribes and Arab pastoralists to continue customary land tenure rights, 
which was a fairly effective way of preventing conflict between these two groups over land.232 
Traditionally, leaders from farming tribes and pastoralist nomadic groups had a system that gave 
different tribes rights over certain lands while allowing negotiation with pastoralists if they 
needed to pass through or were in search of more grazing land. However, the Sudanese 
government dissolved Native Administration in 1971; it would later be reinstated but never 
effectively. This undermined customary land tenure rights. The government also undermined the 
traditional system with the Unregistered Land Act of 1970, which gave ownership of any 
unregistered land to the government.233 The government further ignited land competition issues 
with the Emirate Act of 1995, which gave preference to pastoralists in the area of Dar Marsalis, 
which was traditionally occupied and farmed by the Masalit tribe.234  
Contrary to popular belief, pastoralists and sedentary farmers were not perpetually in 
conflict; in fact, the traditional land tenure system allowed both groups to negotiate with each 
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other on land rights.235 However, government land policies exacerbated tensions and in some 
instances created them. With the progression of climate change, government policies provided 
rural farmers and nomads with no means to adapt and coexist peacefully; rather, pastoralists 
infringed on southern areas and there were no mechanisms for peaceful negotiation.  
Civil Unrest in Darfur 
 It is clear from the events of the civil war that Darfurians experienced high levels of 
discontent leading up to the peak of the violence in 2003. Civil unrest in Sudan is a complex 
issue, and a lot of it goes back all the way to creation of an independent Sudan in 1955. At this 
time, Sudan encompassed a variety of ethnic, cultural, and linguistics groups, which can be 
broadly divided into Arabs in the north and black Africans in the south (though these identities 
are based more on cultural history than genetic differences). In the years after independence, the 
government was dominated by northern Arabs, who attempted to unify the country through 
forced Arabization and Islamization policies.236 This is what initially led to the formation of 
Southern rebel groups fighting for independence. As the years progressed, the regime of Gaafar 
Nimeiry was able to appease the South with a policy of regional autonomy, which he later 
revoked, thus reigniting civil war.237  
Though the Southern rebel movement existed from the 1980s on, the most active part of 
the civil war was from 2003-2005. Darfur was at the heart of this surge in violence—two 
southern rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, 
launched an uprising in the Darfur region in response to “what they saw as government-
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sponsored seizures of their farmland by nomadic Arab herders.”238 Armed Arab militias, known 
as the Janjaweed, responded to the uprising with extremely violent attacks on villages, 
apparently supported by the Sudanese government.239 Significantly, the Janjaweed recruited 
mostly from tenure-less former camel herders in northern and western Darfur.240 The violence in 
this region would later be characterized as genocide against the black Sudanese in the region.241 
The conflict resulted in an estimated 300,000 deaths, and many more victims of sexual violence 
and internal displacement.242 
The war officially ended in 2005 with the signing of peace accords between the 
government and opposition group the National Democratic Alliance.243 By 2006, the government 
had also reached a deal with the Sudanese Liberation Army in Darfur. Some sporadic fighting 
continued, and in 2011, South Sudan gained independence through a popular referendum.244 
However, civil unrest still continues in both Darfur, where violence and hunger remain prevalent, 
and South Sudan, which has not entered a civil war of its own. 
Conclusions from the Sudan and South Sudan Case 
 The crisis in Darfur is one of the most dramatic examples of how climate change can 
affect conflict. In this case, the independent variable of government response to climate change 
was virtually nonexistent—the Sudanese government lacked the administrative capacity to 
address serious environmental threats such as drought, and their land policies following 
independence actually served to exacerbate competition between ethnic groups in Darfur. While 
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there were existing cultural divides between the Arab nomads in northern Darfur and the 
sedentary black farmers in southern Darfur, this did not necessitate the existence of civil unrest 
and conflict. In fact, traditional land tenure systems that existed in the region for decades before 
colonialism were fairly effective at facilitating peaceful coexistence, even in the event of 
droughts. However, this case clearly demonstrates how climate change, and poor environmental 
policies, can serve to fuel civil unrest and, in this instance, violent conflict. The events in Darfur 
show a direct linkage between climate change and conflict, as shown below. 
 
 In a 2007 article for The Washington Post, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asserted 
the connection of the Darfur conflict to climate change, stating: 
It is no accident that the violence in Darfur erupted during the drought. Until then, Arab 
nomadic herders had lived amicably with settled farmers… But once the rains stopped, 
farmers fenced their land for fear it would be ruined by the passing herds. For the first 
time in memory, there was no longer enough food and water for all. Fighting broke out. 
By 2003, it evolved into the full-fledged tragedy we witness today.245 
 
While the existence of unrest in Darfur and the subsequent civil war has more roots than just 
climate change, it offers a clear example of direct impact climate change governance can have on 
unrest and conflict in general. Though the worst point of this crisis has passed, climate change 
will likely continue to influence unrest in this region. As climate change continues to shrink the 
arable land in Sudan, there is potential for further conflict if the government fails to address 
environmental changes. Seeing as governance in Sudan and even more so in South Sudan 
remains weak, climate change will likely cause more crises in the future. 
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 In the Middle East and North Africa, climate change has many implications for social, 
economic, and political systems. Though the direct effect of climate change is environmental, the 
government response to these environmental effects plays a role in determining the extent of 
climate change-induced resource scarcity. Most countries in MENA are naturally prone to 
climatic changes such as drought and desertification, so the influence of anthropogenic climate 
change has resulted in more frequent, severe, and prolonged extreme climatic events. Because of 
this, many populations in the MENA region are affected by climate change—through changes in 
the productivity of farmland, changes in food prices, availability of water and land, and more. As 
the case studies of Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Sudan demonstrated, the way the government 
responds to environmental degradation can dramatically change the effects of climate change on 
the population.  
In Syria, the government created a strong dependency of farmers on subsidies for water-
intensive crops and animal feed; only to suddenly cut these subsidies after the worst drought in 
900 years. In Jordan, the government attempted to respond to their natural resource scarcity by 
promoting more efficient farming techniques and importing water-intensive foods to offset 
agricultural deficiencies. In Tunisia, the government responded to climate change by adopting 
some adaptive farming techniques and taking an active role in stabilizing food prices. In Sudan, 
the government increased the population’s vulnerability to climate change by nationalizing land 
tenure and failing to respond to drought and ensuing famine. Though this thesis only examined 
four case studies, much of the Middle East is facing similar issues, both in terms of the effects of 
climate change and its implications in society. 
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 It is not climate change per se that directly fuels civil unrest, but rather the changes in the 
population's access to vital resources that increases or decreases the intensity of civil unrest. This 
suggests that governments must take an active role in addressing environmental problems to 
ensure that their population has sufficient access. Without access to water, food, and income, a 
humanitarian crisis is likely to occur, which often leads to a high degree of civil unrest. As 
climate change continues in the coming decades, countries in MENA are going to face many 
challenges in ensuring access to vital resources. With events such as drought and desertification, 
agricultural adaptations will be needed to offset the decline in arable land and rainfall. 
The MENA region has experienced a great deal of civil unrest in the past few years. The 
world has watched as much of this unrest has resulted in violence and civil war, which has had a 
massive death toll and created a refugee crisis that has had effects far beyond just the MENA 
region. This thesis has concluded that while government response to climate change is not the 
sole factor in creating civil unrest, it is a factor. As the effects of climate change continue to play 
out in the coming decades, the region is likely to face even more societal consequences. If 
governments do not effectively work to offset these environmental changes, the world may see 
more climate-fueled crises similar to what happened in Syria and Darfur. It is important that 
governments in the MENA region prioritize climate change to protect not only their 
environments, but also their populations. 
 It is also important for policymakers in the West to recognize the importance of 
addressing climate change. This thesis has shown that countries in the MENA region, who have 
contributed relatively little to climate change, have experienced its effects more directly than the 
West. As the main contributors to climate change, the West has indirectly caused many of the 
crises that less developed nations are now facing. Though this might not seem like a topic of 
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immediate importance to lawmakers, the significant implications of climate change on the 
MENA region will affect the U.S. and Europe directly. Instability in the MENA region has 
already posed a number of challenges for global security. The U.S. has been involved in the 
affairs of the Middle East for decades, and this is unlikely to change in the coming years. The 
Syrian Civil War has become an issue of global concern as the humanitarian crisis grows more 
dire and refugees seek asylum in Europe and the U.S. The Middle East is a key security interest 
for the U.S. and Europe, and the stability of this region has been a widely discussed problem for 
Western states and international organizations.  
 This paper has shown that adapting to climate change can be vitally important in ensuring 
the wellbeing of societies in this region. As climate change continues in the coming years, this 
could have massive implications for the overall stability of MENA countries. Given that many of 
these countries do not possess the economic means to implement advanced climate change 
adaptations, it is important that climate change adaptation becomes a top priority in the foreign 
policy of the West and in the actions of international organizations. Climate change governance 
is not simply an issue of environmental protection—it is also an issue of global security, and 
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